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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
V, : Case No. 950039-CA 
ROY WIRTH, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty to one 
count of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2) (a) (i) (1994). This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that defendant's 
backpack was searched incident to his lawful arrest? 
Whether the officer's search of defendant's backpack 
constituted a proper search incident to arrest is a legal 
conclusion, reviewed for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 
(Utah 1993) . 
2. In any event, would the inevitable discovery doctrine 
justify admission of the evidence found in defendant's backpack 
following his lawful arrest? 
Although inevitable discovery was not argued in the trial 
court, this Court "can affirm the trial court on any proper legal 
ground." State v. Hansen, 837 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules 
will be included in the body of the text. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Five charges were brought against defendant: two counts of 
possession of controlled substances (methamphetamine and LSD), both 
third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2) (a) (i) (1994); one count of assault on a police officer, a 
class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 
(1994); one count of interference with an arresting officer, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-3 05 
(1994) ; and one count of disorderly conduct, a class C misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 (1994) (R. 18-20). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his 
backpack on the grounds that the police officers exceeded the 
limits of a search incident to arrest and that the search could not 
otherwise be justified as an inventory search (R. 26-33) . After a 
hearing, the court denied the motion (R. 77-79). Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, defendant subsequently entered a conditional plea 
of guilty to the charges of possession of methamphetamine and 
interfering with arrest or detention (R. 85-88) . He then filed 
this timely appeal (R. 95). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Early on June 27, 1994, Officer Jim Kortright of the 
Clearfield City police department was dispatched to investigate a 
report of a suspicious male (R. 109-110). He found defendant 
"walking up and down the north side of the street swaying his arms 
about and yelling" (R. 110) . When asked what he was doing, 
defendant responded that he was singing. He sat down on the 
ground, removed a harmonica from his backpack, played a few notes, 
and put it away (R. Ill) . Defendant then removed a decorative, 
sheathed Middle Eastern dagger from the backpack. When he began to 
remove the knife from the sheath to show Officer Kortright and 
another officer who had arrived on the scene, the officers told him 
to put it back (R. 112) . After defendant did so, Kortright advised 
him to "pick up all of his stuff, head for the bus stop and go back 
home into Ogden" (Id.) . Defendant headed for the bus stop, and 
Kortright went back to the office (Id.). 
About half an hour later, Kortright returned to the scene to 
check on whether defendant had boarded his bus (R. 113). Kortright 
saw defendant in the middle of the road, and "was advised by a 
citizen, a female, that he had been pounding on windows of cars and 
saying things like 'bless you'" (Id.). Kortright called defendant 
over to him, and defendant complied (R. 114, 121) . Kortright then 
told defendant to put his arms behind his back for a disorderly 
conduct arrest (R. 114). Defendant did not comply. 
Instead, defendant "came at" Kortright (R. 114). At the same 
time, Kortright's dog escaped from the patrol car, requiring some 
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attention, and Kortright made a failed attempt at applying 
numchucks to defendant's wrist. Ultimately, with help from two 
passing citizens, Kortright tackled defendant and held him in a 
bear hug until other officers arrived (R. 52, 114-15). Once the 
arrest was finally made, defendant was placed in a patrol car (R. 
116, 124) . At that point, Kortright told his fellow officers that 
the backpack by the bus stop, some 10 to 15 feet away, belonged to 
defendant and that it contained a dagger (R. 116, 123) . One of the 
officers went through the backpack and discovered, along with the 
dagger and various other personal items, methamphetamine and LSD in 
the pocket of a pair of pants (R. 117) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly determined that the search of 
defendant's backpack, some 10 to 15 feet away from defendant at the 
time he physically resisted arrest, was a lawful search incident to 
arrest. Defendant argues that the search was beyond the scope of 
this exception to the warrant requirement, improperly focusing on 
the static post-arrest scenario, when defendant was handcuffed, 
shackled, and secured in a police car. The proper analytical 
focus, however, should be on the circumstances immediately 
surrounding the arrest, which were marked by defendant "coming at" 
the officer, and the officer ultimately subduing defendant, with 
citizen help, on the ground in a bear hug until further police help 
arrived. Because the backpack, which the officer knew contained a 
weapon, was within defendant's area of immediate control at the 
time of the arrest, the officers lawfully searched it incident to 
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defendant's arrest. 
Alternatively, the contraband found in defendant's backpack 
would have inevitably been discovered once defendant was booked 
into jail following his arrest. The arresting officer testified 
that the jail followed a routine inventory procedure which would 
include a complete written record of the contents of defendant's 
backpack. Thus, even if the backpack had not been searched 
immediately following defendant's arrest, it would have been 
subject to a complete inventory at the jail which would have 
revealed the contraband defendant now seeks to have suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED 
THAT THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S 
BACKPACK WAS INCIDENT TO HIS LAWFUL 
ARREST 
A search incident to arrest is one exception to the fourth 
amendment's warrant requirement. The United States Supreme Court 
has established the parameters of this exception.1 A warrantless 
search of both an arrestee and the area "within his immediate 
control" are permissible for the limited purposes of preventing the 
arrestee from gaining control over a weapon or from destroying 
evidence of a crime. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 
(1969); accord State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 180 (Utah 1983). 
1
 Defendant states that the protection afforded an arrestee 
under the Utah Constitution may be greater than under the United 
States Constitution. See Br. of App. at 6. Because defendant 
fails to develop an argument addressing the distinction, however, 
this analysis proceeds under federal law. See, e.g., State v. 
Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 70 (Utah App. 1989). 
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The crux of defendant's argument is that the officers' search 
of his backpack fell outside the ambit of this exception (Br. of 
App. at 11-12) . The backpack was 10 to 15 feet away from 
defendant, five officers were present, and defendant was shackled, 
in handcuffs, and seated in a police car at the time of the search. 
In defendant's view, the backpack was thus not "within his 
immediate control." Therefore, defendant concludes, the officers 
should have obtained a warrant before searching it. 
Defendant's argument fails because he has mistakenly focused 
on the static post-arrest tableau rather than on the unpredictable 
circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the arrest. 
The United States Supreme Court has construed the phrase 
"within his immediate control" in the context of a search incident 
to arrest to mean "the area from within which [a suspect] might 
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. at 763. When an automobile stop is involved, 
the area of immediate control "can extend to a closed container 
left in the passenger area of a car, even after the arrestee has 
been moved away from the car." State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 
784 (Utah App. 1991) (citing New York v. Bel ton. 453 U.S. 454, 461 
(1981)), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). The same 
interpretation applies to situations in which an automobile is not 
involved. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(a), at 534 
(1987) (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)); see also 
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 784-85 (Utah App. 1991) (search of 
diaper bag in stroller 10 feet away from defendant at time of 
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arrest permissible); State v. Houser, 669 P.2d 437, 440 (Utah 1983) 
(search of arrestee's backpack permissible). In essence, every 
person arrested is viewed "as a combination acrobat and Houdini who 
might well free himself from his restraints and suddenly gain 
access to some distant place." 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 6.3(c), at 628 (1987). Because the theoretical 
underpinning for the search incident to arrest exception 
encompasses the fluid circumstances potentially accompanying any 
arrest, it makes no analytical difference whether the search occurs 
before or after the arrest, as long as the two events are basically 
contemporaneous. See, e.g., State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111-12 
(Utah App. 1988), cert, denied 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1383-84 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, defendant's backpack was within his area of 
immediate control, as courts have defined that term. When the* 
physical confrontation with Officer Kortright began, defendant was 
about five steps away from his pack (R. 123). Defendant had just 
"come at" Kortright. By his own admission, Kortright was 
struggling for control of the situation, evidenced by his testimony 
that he was distracted by his escaping dog, he was unable to apply 
his numchucks effectively, and he needed help from two passing 
citizens to subdue and control defendant (R. 52, 114-15, 124) . 
Certainly, at that juncture, defendant could have reached his 
backpack. And, had defendant physically prevailed, he could have 
gained possession of his knife, plainly a weapon. Thus, for 
purposes of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant 
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requirement, defendant's backpack was "within his immediate 
control." 
Defendant also asserts that the search was improper because 
there was no realistic possibility that he could injure the 
officers with the contents of his backpack or destroy any of its 
contents (Br. of App. at 7-10) . This argument, however, is 
identical to his argument that the backpack was not within his 
immediate control. Chimel's definition of immediate control is 
"the area from within which [a suspect] might gain possession of a 
weapon or destructible evidence. Chimel v. California, 3 95 U.S. at 
763. Thus, definitionally, if the backpack was within defendant's 
immediate control, it was also in a place where he could retrieve 
a weapon or destroy evidence. 
Finally, defendant objects to the trial court's "theoretical" 
rather than "practical" analysis of search incident to arrest. He 
argues that a "theoretical" analysis has "no limit at all" because, 
theoretically, "anything is possible" (Br. of App. at 13-14) . In 
context, however, the trial court's oral ruling reflects an 
accurate understanding of search incident to arrest. The court 
stated: 
Both counsel adequately argue the point that 
the theory behind the search incident to 
arrest is based on the philosophy that [it] is 
conducted to protect police or public or 
prevent loss of evidence. . . .[T]he analysis 
is one from a theoretical standpoint, not from 
a practical standpoint. The issue becomes 
what were the circumstances immediately at the 
time of the arrest, not 10 minutes later when 
the defendant maybe was in custody and 
shackled, but what were the circumstances 
immediately at the time of arrest. 
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The Court would find that from a theoretical 
standpoint, there could have been a weapon in 
that bag that could have theoretically been 
obtained by the defendant or theoretically 
could have been obtained by some third person 
to the injury of the public, and for that 
reason, the Court would find that the officers 
in conducting the search in the manner in 
which it was conducted in such close proximity 
to the defendant was concurrent with the 
arrest and was properly executing a search 
incident to an arrest. 
R. 152-53 or addendum A. 
The clear import of the trial court's ruling is that a search 
incident to arrest must be analyzed from the perspective of the 
officers at the time of the arrest, rather than from the 
comfortable vantage point of hindsight, as defendant would prefer. 
In Chimel, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for 
the arresting officer to search the person 
arrested in order to remove any weapons that 
the latter might seek to use in order to 
resist arrest or effect his escape. 
Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be 
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. 
In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the 
arresting officer to search for and seize any 
evidence on the arrestee's person in order to 
prevent its concealment or destruction. And 
the area into which an arrestee might reach in 
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items 
must, of course, be governed by a like rule. 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 762-63 (emphasis added). 
Plainly, the trial court's use of the word "theoretical" is 
consistent with the Supreme Court's use of the word "might." Both 
reflect the reality that circumstances surrounding an arrest can 
change quickly, and that officers must take the unknown into 
account as they proceed through an arrest. Defendant's preference 
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for a "practical" approach--meaning an outcome-based analysis--
simply has no support in the law. 
Because the trial court properly determined that defendant was 
searched incident to his arrest and because, in any case, the 
officer's testimony established that the contraband would 
inevitably have been discovered at the jail, this Court should 
uphold the denial of defendant's motion to suppress and affirm his 
conviction. 
POINT TWO 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE ADMISSION OF THE 
METHAMPHETAMINE SHOULD BE UPHELD 
UNDER THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY RULE. 
If this Court determines that the search of defendant's 
backpack was not a proper search incident to arrest, it should 
nonetheless uphold the admission of the methamphetamine under the 
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, because an 
inventory search conducted when defendant arrived at the jail would 
have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the contraband.2 
The inevitable discovery rule is an exception to the 
exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Nix 
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), and recognized in Utah in State 
v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1988); see also State v. 
Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Utah App. 1990) (noting recognition of 
inevitable discovery rule in Northrup), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 
2
 Although inevitable discovery was not argued at the 
suppression hearing, this Court "can affirm the trial court on any 
proper legal ground." State v. Hansen, 837 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
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(Utah 1991). "The inevitable discovery rule allows the admission 
of evidence as long as 'the prosecution can establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or 
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means./fI State v. 
Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1111 n.19 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. at 444), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (1991), 
cert, denied 503 U.S. 914 (1992). 
Defendant here does not claim that his arrest was invalid. He 
argues only that the on-the-scene search of his backpack was not a 
lawful search incident to arrest. Defendant has failed to 
recognize, however, that his backpack would have nevertheless been 
later subject to an inventory search as a standard part of the 
arrest procedure. 
An inventory search may be performed on "any container or 
article in an arrested person's possession as part of established 
inventory procedures incident to incarcerating an arrested person." 
State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Illinois v. 
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983)), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 
(Utah 1989) ; see also State v. Stricklina, 844 P.2d 979, 988 (Utah 
App. 1992). As a result of defendant's lawful arrest, his 
backpack--known by the police both to be his and to contain a 
weapon--could not be left at the bus stop but would have to be 
taken to jail with him (R. 111-12, 116) . The backpack would, 
therefore, have been subject to an inventory search at the jail, 
which would have disclosed the contraband. 
The record supports this conclusion. Officer Kortright 
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testified that the jail's inventory procedure would cover "the 
total contents" of defendant's backpack and that jail personnel 
would maintain a written inventory of the items turned over to them 
(R. 127, 129, 134). Kortright's testimony showed it was standard 
procedure for the arresting officer to make a list of any items 
removed from the arrestee, and then to turn the property over to 
the jail for a complete inventory of any items not removed (R. 127, 
128-29). This testimony provides sufficient record evidence for 
the Court to determine that the inevitable discovery rule has been 
satisfied. Cf. State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1253-54 (Utah App. 
1990) (remanding for factual findings on inevitable discovery of 
ring that suspect swallowed, where issue was considered for first 
time on appeal and record contained no evidence relevant to 
inevitable discovery). 
Thus, even if the backpack had not been searched immediately 
following defendant's arrest, it would still have been subject to 
a complete inventory when it arrived at the jail with defendant 
following his booking. That lawful inventory would more likely 
than not have disclosed the contraband, which is therefore 
admissible under the inevitable discovery rule. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /p day of May, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
kttorrvey General 
C JfrfkJt^ 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of Appellee were mailed first class, postage 
prepaid, to Christopher L. Shaw, Attorney for Defendant, Gridley, 
Ward, Havas, Hamilton & Shaw, 635 25th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401, 
this J8i day of May, 1995 ^ 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Tr ia l Cour t ' s Oral Ruling 
On Motion to Suppress 
basis. 
THE COURT: Mr. Shaw, anything further? 
MR. SHAW: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Court will rule as follows in 
this matter. First of all, it's clear to the Court that both 
of the parties concede that the arrest was made with probable 
cause and was appropriate. I have heard no other argument 
otherwise in this matter. 
The next question turns to the appropriateness of 
the search that occurred in this matter. There is no 
question that under the law, the Fourth Amendment and Article 
I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution precludes 
warrant searches in only a few accepted circumstances, one of 
those being incident to a lawful arrest. As I've indicated 
there was no intention that the arrest was not lawful in this 
matter. So the question becomes whether or not this search 
was appropriate under the provisions of an arrest incident or 
a search incident to arrest. 
Both counsel adequately argue the point that the 
theory behind the search incident to arrest is based on the 
philosophy that is conducted to protect police or public or 
prevent loss of evidence. I would note that I see no 
appreciable difference in the rationale behind a search 
incident to an arrest between that of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 14 of the 
47 
Utah State Constitution. And in all of those cases, the 
analysis is one from a theoretical standpoint, not from a 
practical standpoint. The issue becomes what were the 
circumstances immediately at the time of the arrest, not 10 
minutes later when the defendant maybe was in custody and 
shackled, but what were the circumstances immediately at the 
time of the arrest. 
In the matter here before the Court, at the time 
of the arrest, the backpack was 10 to 15 feet away from the 
defendant. The backpack was known to contain at least a 
knife. The backpack was in a public area on a public street, 
and based upon those circumstances, the Court would find that 
since the search was incident to the arrest, essentially in 
this case it was concurrent with the arrest. 
The Court would find that from a theoretical 
standpoint, there could have been a weapon in that bag that 
could have theoretically been obtained by the defendant or 
theoretically could have been obtained by some third person 
to the injury of the public, and for that reason, the Court 
would find that the officers in conducting the search in the 
manner in which it was conducted in such close proximity to 
the defendant was concurrent with the arrest and was properly 
executing a search incident to an arrest.. 
The Court does not find that this is an inventory 
search. First of all, the theory behind inventory searches 
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is basically it's done to protect the agency from civil 
liability for items which may have been confiscated and later 
found to be missing. Any inventory search that the officers 
conduct, in this particular case, if that's their policy, 
does not meet that rationale. What may have been of value in 
their estimation may not be in the defendant's or vice versa. 
So I don't think this case can be argued on the basis of an 
inventory search. 
The Court further finds that the evidence is 
uncontroverted that the backpack was taken into custody at 
the time of the arrest and was ultimately delivered to the 
Davis County Sheriff's Department concurrent with the 
delivery of the defendant. So the Court hinges its decision 
on the theory behind the arrest search incident to a valid 
arrest. The Court therefore denies the defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
I will ask, Mr. McGuire, you prepare findings and 
judgment in accordance with my ruling and submit it to 
Mr. Shaw for review, and make sure it has in it the facts he 
has that he desires, for whatever value it might have in the 
future. 
(Whereupon other matters were held.) 
* * * * * 
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ADDENDUM B 
Trial Court's Written Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order 
r;.rr 
William K. McGuire #2192 
Davis County Attorney's Office 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-4300 
FILED IH ULERK'S o r ; 
JSHI2 l0 3uB f 9S 
CLERK. ^ : - : ^ . . G S j r t : 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JlWlCgg^WJgBIHlCT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROY P. WIRTH, 
Defendant. 
: FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
: 
: Case No. 941700541 
: Hon. Rodney S. Page, Judge 
This matter came on for hearing before the above-entitled 
court on November 23, 1994. The defendant was present with his 
attorney, Christopher Shaw, the State was present and represented 
by William K. McGuire, Deputy Davis County Attorney, the Honorable 
Rodney S. Page, presided. 
The Court after having heard evidence presented and 
reviewing memoranda submitted by the parties, hereby enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On June 27, 1994, the defendant was arrested for 
disorderly conduct as a result of his impeding traffic. 
2. At the time of his arrest defendant's backpack was 
sitting approximately 10-15 feet away from him. 
3. The arresting officer, Jim Kortright of Clearfield 
Police Department, had previously seen a knife in the backpack. 
The backpack was retrieved at the time of the arrest and was 
searched. 
4. During the search of the backpack some 
xnethamphetamine and LSD were located. The knife was also located 
in the backpack. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters 
its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The arrest of the defendant was a valid arrest. 
2. The question of whether a search is incident to 
arrest is the same under both the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution since there is no appreciable difference in the 
rationale behind a search incident to arrest in those two 
provisions. 
3. The seizure and search of the backpack was incident 
to arrest. The backpack was open and available to not only the 
defendant but potentially to a third person which could cause 
damage or injuiry to the public. Based upon the proximity and time 
and location to the defendant and his arrest, the search was 
therefore incident to arrest. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, it now enters the following: 
ORDER 
Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby denied. 
